NATO in Dayton: Part 1
Historical Briefing - Revisiting the Balkans
By Carl Teichrib
During the weekend of May 22-26, Dayton Ohio was the diplomatic epicenter of NATO as the Spring 2025 Parliamentary Assembly convened, turning the city’s downtown into a high security zone. Approximately 240 parliamentary delegates from NATO’s 32 member countries attended, along with NATO leaders and a host of other dignitaries – heads of state, diplomats, military officers, and representatives from non-member Partnership for Peace countries.1 An assortment of other personalities moved within this setting; security experts, members of foreign policy organizations, intelligence personnel, and representatives from industry.
Unconsidered by most in the public, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – also known as the Alliance – has an independent Parliament embedded within the NATO system. Established in 1955, this Parliament provides a link between NATO and member nations’ elected governments, thereby giving delegated parliamentarians a formal role in evaluating and shaping NATO policies. Although it operates within the NATO framework, the Parliament is a separate institution, an environment where common agendas can be hashed out. And while the Assembly is not responsible for directing NATO operations, it does exert influence by shaping the political and public climate around NATO’s activities.
This year marked the 70th Parliament. More important, this Assembly coincided with the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accord, which was finalized at Dayton’s Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in 1995, cementing an end to the Bosnian war. However, NATO’s action in the Balkans during the 1990s was not without controversy, and this is worth considering as the region was central to the recent Dayton agenda — not excluding the ongoing war in Ukraine.
The following is a general overview of NATO’s posturing within this critical region.
NATO Beyond
NATO’s involvement in Bosnia was the first time the Alliance had used military force since its inception in 1949. This intervention, however, happened outside of Article 5 – the NATO provision by which if one member of the Alliance is attacked, then all members are to collectively assist in its defense.2 None of the Yugoslav break-away states were NATO members at the time.
Instead of standing on Article 5, NATO entered the Balkans in support of United Nations operations, functionally engaging as the UN’s proxy without being under its command. Beginning in 1992, the United Nations had a peacekeeping mission in place, backed by a series of resolutions, including the establishment of a no-fly zone. NATO and its member nations monitored and enforced the no-fly zone, and the Alliance’s presence in the region expanded. By 1995 a UN resolution called for the development of a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), and NATO assumed this role under chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
Russia’s response was interesting considering today’s environment; it operated alongside NATO within IFOR. Russia had also joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the Alliance’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and there was talk of full membership. In fact, in 1995 a Russian Destroyer took part in NATO exercises. Keep in mind that all of this happened during the early phase of the post-Cold War years.
Later, in 1999, NATO forces engaged in Kosovo without a UN resolution. Whereas the Bosnian operation was justified via the United Nations, the Kosovo campaign never had a mandate. Rather, it was extolled as a humanitarian venture - an attempt to stop atrocities. Russia, on the other hand, was opposed. Moscow supported the Serbian cause, and it feared NATO would expand into eastern Europe. Russia also worried that if NATO could intervene in a sovereign state without UN approval, it could rationalize future interventions elsewhere – including the former Soviet republics.
NATO’s maneuvering in the Balkans had mixed results. On one hand it brought peace, ending the conflict in Bosnia and bringing stability to Kosovo – indeed, Kosovo is considered a victory, a NATO success. In this it achieved its goals. But it also took civilian lives, damaged infrastructure, and the governance system left in the wake of the Dayton Peace Accord entrenched ethnic divisions that are still fermenting. And, as already mentioned, it drove a wedge between Russia and the West.
Geopolitically it reset the region. Four of the seven post-Yugoslav nation-states have joined NATO, and of those four, two are EU members.3 Furthermore, two non-member nations – Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo – have aspirations to join. Another factor is the Berlin Process, a political platform designed to connect the Western Balkans within the Common Market, encouraging domestic reform with an eye to EU membership while opening the way for cross-border investments. Besides restructuring the territories, the geopolitical reset placed the Balkans squarely within the European sphere of influence and solidified the region as an American interest. It was a re-positioning toward the West in a local that had, during the Cold War period, been a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement as an independent socialist state.
Finally, NATO’s engagement in the Balkans played into the question of intervention and state sovereignty. As the Alliance had stepped outside its traditional boundaries of member defense, becoming the enforcer of the international community, its actions became part of the growing debate regarding sovereignty limits. If a nation is failing domestically and incapable of protecting its citizens, is it the responsibility of the international community to override national sovereignty and forcefully intercede?
Two years after NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo wrapped up, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) recommended that the UN adopt a new military doctrine known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – a call for the global community to override sovereignty if deemed necessary. Nevertheless, the ICISS report, referencing the NATO/Kosovo situation, highlighted the complexity,
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 brought the controversy to its most intense head. Security Council members were divided; the legal justification for military action without new Security Council authority was asserted but largely unargued; the moral or humanitarian justification for the action, which on the face of it was much stronger, was clouded by allegations that the intervention generated more carnage than it averted; and there were many criticisms of the way in which the NATO allies conducted the operation…4
The operation raised major quest ions about the legitimacy of military intervention in a sovereign state. Was the cause just: were the human rights abuses committed or threatened by the Belgrade authorities sufficiently serious to warrant outside involvement? Did those seeking secession manipulate external intervention to advance their political purposes? Were all peaceful means of resolving the conflict fully explored? Did the intervention receive appropriate authority? How could the bypassing and marginalization of the UN system, by ‘a coalition of the willing’ acting without Security Council approval, possibly be justified? Did the way in which the intervention was carried out in fact worsen the very human rights situation it was trying to rectify? Or – against all this – was it the case that had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) not intervened, Kosovo would have been at best the site of an ongoing, bloody and destabilizing civil war, and at worst the occasion for genocidal slaughter like that which occurred in Bosnia four years earlier?5
Note: The 2011 NATO attack against Libya was explicitly framed as an R2P operation.
For most people the Balkan crisis of the 1990s is a footnote. For those in the region it is anything but – and for NATO, it is a significant marker pointing to the Alliance’s role in reshaping Europe. Currently, however, signals indicate that different parts of the Balkans could be nearing an inflection point.
Secessionist threats by the Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Srpska opposing EU integration while aligning with Russian interests.
A stalling of the relationships between Serbia and Kosovo, with Serbia refusing to recognize Kosovo's independence. This hinders Kosovo's aspirations for EU and NATO membership.
An increasing polarization of Montenegro's political landscape since its 2023 election, which resulted in a coalition government with pro-Serbian and pro-Russian elements. Domestic concerns have been raised about the country's Western orientation, and identity narratives have complicated efforts.
Serbia’s administration faces corruption allegations and governance failures, inciting domestic unrest. Simultaneously, Serbia has aligned with Moscow over certain geopolitical issues. The nation appears to be moving toward a crossroad, with regional implications.
The overall inflection point hinges on this: to build on the stability and security incentives provided by the EU and NATO, verses Russian political influence and Chinese economic motivation.
In other words, the Grand Chessboard remains in motion. Read between the lines: there’s more at stake than any single nation-state in the Balkans — it is the contact point for grand visions and global narratives, a perilous confluence of competing world orders.
All of this served as the backdrop to the Dayton Parliament.
Five Developments through Dayton
The NATO Assembly highlighted the desire for deeper integration of the Balkans into Western institutions, and to unify efforts regarding support for Ukraine. Here are five short examples of what transpired at the Dayton Parliament, along with documents.
1. Declaration 497: Peace Through Strength in Ukraine
The Assembly adopted a strong declaration reaffirming NATO’s backing of Ukraine. It emphasized that any peace settlement must uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It committed member nations to sustain and increase diplomatic, military and financial support, and to align defense industries with Ukraine.
NOTE: In a June 3 Euractiv article it was reported,
NATO countries are planning to count fresh money spent on bolstering Ukraine's military as ‘defence-related’ under NATO's proposal to raise defence spending targets to 5% of GDP… New purchases of military equipment specifically for Kyiv, as well as investment in the Ukrainian arms industry, would be counted as ‘defence-related’ spending by NATO countries under the new spending targets.
2. Declaration 496: Advancing NATO Deterrence and Defense
Declaration 496 called for enhancing NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. This is to happen by raising defense spending and bolstering the industrial base. Declaration 496 set the stage for discussions at the upcoming NATO Summit later in June.
3. Report on the Western Balkans: 30 Years Since the Dayton Accords
This report assesses the progress and ongoing challenges in the Western Balkans. It recognizes structural problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, noting that Russian and Chinese influence is driving a wedge.
4. CRINK Report: Addressing Emerging Global Threats
The Assembly examined the growing alignment among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—collectively referred to as CRINK. This document outlines the multifaceted threats and recommended strategies. It is important in that it aligns NATOs interests in the Indo-Pacific zone, which is traditionally outside its boundaries.
5. War in Ukraine and Black Sea Challenges.
Released before the Dayton Parliament, this document examines the Ukrainian war in light of Black Sea challenges, including energy issues.
But the Dayton Parliament was not the only event in town. Just south of where the NATO Village had been cordoned, at the Roger Glass Center for the Arts — itself wrapped in a cocoon — the NATO Dialogue Forum was taking place.
And we were there.
Part 2 coming soon.
Endnotes:
There are 35 non-member countries in the Partnership for Peace program (PfP). Non-member status does not grant collective security rights under Article 5, nor is the participating nation bound by NATO decisions. It does, however, allow the nation to engage in diplomatic efforts and strategic dialogues, to participate in joint training exercises, and gain access to specialized NATO programs. For some countries, being part of the PfP is viewed as a process of alignment for eventual full membership.
NATO Article 5 reads: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."
"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."
NATO members: Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. EU members: Slovenia and Croatia.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, 2001), p.VII.
Ibid., p.1.
Very good explanation of the background and setting, Carl. Thank you.